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QUI BONO? 
The Winners and Losers of Securitising Migration 
Georgios Karyotis and Dimitris Skleparis* 
It has become commonplace to argue that migration in most host 
states is socially constructed primarily as a security threat, a 
process known as ʻsecuritisationʼ. Political elites and security 
professionals are identified as the main agents that promote this 
particular framing of the issue. While securitisation is often implicitly 
considered as a goal-orientated process, paradoxically few studies 
have explored its actual consequences on policy and the 
securitising actors themselves. Adopting a consequentialist ethics 
approach, this article assesses the implications of the securitisation 
of migration in Greece, drawing on face-to-face interviews with 
security professionals, discourse analysis and other primary data. It 
demonstrates that securitisation harms the interests not only of 
migrants but also, counter-intuitively, of the state and the elites that 
supported it in the first place. This leaves only parties of the far right 
as the main winners of the security frame that has characterised 
Greeceʼs stance on immigration since the early 1990s, and that 
continues to pose obstacles to its development of a coherent 
immigration policy with a long-term view. 
The proliferation of movement of people and mobility in a globalised world 
has, in most Western states, gone hand in hand with a prevailing 
understanding of migration as a security issue. Migration is typically linked 
to a range of socio-political and economic threats to the host states, which in 
turn seek to curtail their development by adopting restrictive policies. The 
global financial and debt crises that started to unfold in 2007 further 
exacerbated pre-existing tensions, altering the dynamic between state, 
citizens and migrants. Unsurprisingly, times of economic downturn breed 
intolerance and reactivate nationalist reflexes, which in many cases have 
facilitated not only an increase in anti-immigration attitudes and support for 
far-right parties but also a return to the public sphere of historically loaded 
terms, such as ‘ethnic purity’ and ‘racial unity’. 
Nevertheless, this dominant interpretation of migration as a menace is 
neither unchallenged nor inevitable. It is the outcome of a social construction 
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process, mediated by language and social practices, where actors with vested 
interests are engaged in recurring framing conflicts about the correct or standard 
way to define the issue.1 In the political and social spheres, frames function as 
lenses that set the parameters for audiences to interpret, categorise and evaluate 
complex or ambiguous developments, such as people’s movements.2 This may 
be achieved through subtle differences in the presentation of an issue or more 
direct attempts to draw attention to a subset of potentially relevant 
considerations, while ignoring others.3 For instance, making the perceived 
threats migration poses more salient in discourse, promotes ‘a particular problem 
definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation’,4 which has the potential to lock debates about its impact on 
host societies within a security logic. 
This type of framing, which seeks to shift an issue from normal politics 
into the security realm by depicting it as a threat to key values, is known in 
the literature as a ‘securitising move’.5 Since the mid-1990s, a wealth of 
empirical studies on a range of issues and national contexts have greatly 
contributed to our understanding of how securitisation processes work. 
Among others, these have identified political discourses,6 security practices,7 
legal frameworks8 and visual images9 as central to the construction of the 
security frame. When this becomes the dominant way to define an issue and 
is accepted as such by an empowering audience, it may be used to legitimise 
the adoption of urgent policy responses to block its development, which 
otherwise might not have been possible or tolerated. 
Civil society groups and critical security scholars have widely criticised 
the moral bankruptcy of the securitised frame for its impact on migrant 
rights in particular.10 Yet the implications of securitisation for the state and 
the elites that support it in the first place have received scarce attention. It is 
generally assumed that political elites and security professionals, i.e. the 
main securitising actors, have vested interests in depicting migration as a 
security issue.11 After all, as Stone12 notes, how an issue is defined is always 
‘strategic because groups, individuals and government agencies deliberately 
and consciously fashion portrayals so as to promote their favored course of 
action’. The ensuing questions are to what extent does the securitisation of 
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migration benefit the state or society and serve the interests of those who 
frame it in that way? Who are the winners and losers of securitising 
migration, and what are its unintended consequences? 
To explore these questions, this article studies the implications of 
securitisation of migration in Greece, 20 years after it unexpectedly became 
host to large, mostly undocumented migrant communities. The persistence 
of the security logic and high anti-immigration attitudes during this period,13 
combined with the meteoric rise of support for far-right parties following the 
onset of the economic crisis, makes Greece an ideal setting for exploring 
some of the less-visible aspects of securitisation. The article draws on 
discourse analysis, elite interviews with security professionals and other 
primary data, arguing that securitising migration is on the whole counter-
productive for both the referent object and securitising agents, with 
unintended costs that far outweigh any short-term perceived gains. 
The first section of the article engages with theoretical debates 
surrounding securitisation that are relevant to the security–migration nexus 
and its consequences. The next section provides an overview of the 
securitisation of migration in Greece and its predictably detrimental impact 
on migrants. The remainder of the article focuses on the implications of 
securitisation for policy and for the main securitising agents, drawing on 
Rita Floyd’s consequentialist ethics approach. 
Elite Rationality and Securitisation 
In the area of migration, there are two main frames competing for 
prevalence. The ‘realist policy frame’ contains a dominant interpretation of 
migration as a security problem. Rooted in a state-centric philosophy, the 
realist frame underlines the need to secure borders, restrict migration and 
homogenise all categories of migrants into a single policing-repression 
scheme. In contrast, the ‘liberal frame’ shifts the focus from the state to the 
individual. It is concerned primarily with the protection of migrant human 
rights and the reduction of barriers to labour migration, considered to be 
beneficial to the host economy.14 In relation to migration, it is the security 
frame that in most cases dominates, with securitisation theory offering the 
most useful framework through which to study how it is constructed. 
Securitisation studies is an ever-growing and dynamic sub-field, 
comprising scholars from different disciplines, contested theoretical 
underpinnings and diverse methodological approaches, who share an interest 
in how security issues emerge, spread and dissolve. Securitisation occurs 
when actors, speaking or acting in the name of a referent object, succeed in 
convincing an empowering audience that the perceived seriousness of a 
threat, regardless of its objective significance, justifies the mobilisation of all 
available resources to curtail its development. While conceptual ambiguities 
13 Triandafyllidou (2009); Karyotis (2012). 
14 Lavenex (2001). 
about its exact dynamics remain the subject of theoretical debate,15 for the 
purposes of this article, securitisation is defined as the outcome of a strategic 
process of interrelated discourses, practices and configuration of 
circumstances that result in the social construction of an issue as a threat.16  
In principle, anyone could act as a securitising actor. However, because 
security ‘is a structured field’ that involves a high degree of centralisation 
and a low level of pluralism, certain actors are better placed to write 
legitimate security discourses.17 The most influential securitising actors, with 
the required societal currency, know-how and status, are usually political 
elites, such as those in government18 and ‘security professionals’, such as 
police officers, border control enforcers and in some cases members of the 
army.19 In the area of migration in particular, the high levels of 
institutionalisation and the ‘relatively weak level of civil society 
engagement’ mean that political and security elites are best placed to shape 
public attitudes and determine policy outcomes ‘in a relatively autonomous 
way’.20 The question is why these actors, more often than not, support the 
security frame. Are their discourses, practices and policies based on a cost-
benefit assessment of a range of possible options? Are they perhaps driven 
by a genuine concern for the ‘real’ threats they believe migration poses?  
A first reading of securitisation in relation to the under-theorised 
question of agents’ motivations21 would deem it to be a purposeful, 
orchestrated, elite-driven process. Elites are assumed to be acting rationally 
in terms of both personal interests and their professional responsibility. The 
tangible intended consequences of successful securitisation, the theory goes, 
are an increased urgency to deal with the issue, the attraction of greater 
resources and, often, immunity and exceptional means outside the formal 
and established procedures of politics.22 Accordingly, a successful 
securitisation that is based on a rational calculation should hypothetically 
lead to a better handling of an issue, while promoting the vested interests of 
the securitising actors, which are thought to benefit from the securitisation of 
migration in particular.23 
However, on closer inspection, the assumption of rationality, as in the 
classic expected-utility model, is problematic in securitisation instances for 
15 Central to these debates are questions about whether securitisation should be tied 
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at least four reasons. First, information overload, uncertainty and complexity 
‘make it almost impossible’ for policy-makers to live up to the ideal of the 
rational method.24 In the case of irregular migration, this is particularly 
relevant, since statistics about its size and impact are notoriously slippery 
and unreliable.25 Second, psychological factors, influenced by a given 
cultural and social context, also limit pure rationality. These include pre-
existing beliefs, emotions and ideas about their own role and the values that 
are deemed to be protecting (e.g. identity), which shape their ‘operational 
environment’.26 Third, path-dependencies and historical trajectories 
associated with a particular national context can either facilitate or restrict 
policy-makers’ ability to define it in security or alternative terms.27 Finally, 
agents cannot adequately predict the outcome of a securitising move, the 
success of which ultimately depends on the audience’s acceptance of it and 
other influences, such as competitive framing by other actors.28 
These suggest that securitisation is not necessarily preceded by a 
premeditated design,29 yet do not imply that decision-makers are irrational.30 
Social action, as Pouliot31 puts it, can be ‘oriented toward a goal without 
being consciously informed by it’. Indeed, elites ‘want to make rational 
decisions, but they cannot always do so’,32 because the social fields and 
context within which they operate pose obstacles to the pursuit of a truly 
optimised solution to a policy problem. Instead, given their ‘bounded 
rationality’,33 elites are more likely to accept the first outcome that 
approximates their preferences, rather than strive for the best option that may 
in their eyes appear costly, unattainable or subconsciously incompatible with 
their inherited habitus.34 As a result, once a particular way of viewing or 
dealing with an issue becomes established and institutionalised, it is likely to 
resist change, even if the social power relations that facilitated its emergence 
have changed.35  
Assessing the implications of securitisation from a deontological ethics 
perspective suggests that it is always a negative development. For instance, 
Claudia Aradau, among others, sees securitisation as problematic because it 
produces divisive categorisations of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, and of 
24 Hill (2003), p 102. 
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‘winners’ and ‘losers’.36 The securitisation of migration in particular not only 
has a detrimental impact on migrant human rights,37 but also results in 
morally questionable constructions of identities through exclusion and 
adversity, which define ‘Us’ on the basis of hostility with a supposedly 
threatening and inferior ‘Them’.38 From the earlier analysis, a limitation of 
such critiques is that elites in positions of authority would be more likely to 
reproduce an established security frame, rather than opt for the riskier 
strategy of supporting an alternative liberal one – especially when this is 
informed by normative considerations, which are typically sidelined in the 
face of ‘real’ or perceived threats. 
Perhaps a more fruitful way to bring morality into this discussion is to 
follow the classical realist Morgenthau’s understanding of it, which only 
assesses the consequences, not the ethics or intentions, of political action. 
Morgenthau39 argues that the test of political success and the only aspect of 
morality that matters concerns questions of power. Morality for statesmen is 
different from morality for the people, and is primarily about maintaining, 
increasing or demonstrating the power of the state and its leading elites. 
A more apt way to assess the implications of securitisation of migration is to 
explore the extent to which it is a productive strategy that advances the 
interests of the state and its elites. 
Echoing Morgenthau’s understanding of morality, Rita Floyd 
champions the consequentialist ethics approach to evaluate securitisation 
instances.40 According to this, securitisation is neither a priori positive nor 
negative; rather, it is issue-dependent. To assess the consequences of 
securitisation, Floyd suggests,41 a double evaluation is required on whether it 
brings benefits for the referent object it seeks to protect and/or for the elites 
that support it. In other words, ‘referent object benefiting securitisation’ 
concerns the extent to which it enables the interests of a wider, declared 
referent (for example, the state or society), while ‘agent benefiting 
securitisation’ is more narrowly concerned with its impact on the power and 
interests of the securitising actors. Weighing the benefits against the costs of 
securitisation – arguably a central aspect of any form of normative inquiry – 
is a prerequisite for evaluating its consequences and therefore its morality. In 
other words, ‘depending on who/what benefits from any given securitization, 
it can be either morally right or morally wrong’.42 
In what follows, the article applies this consequentialist ethics approach 
to assess the implications of securitisation of migration in Greece. While it is 
36 Aradau (2004). 
37 Lohrmann (2000); Guild (2003). 
38 Huysmans (1998), p 576; Behnke (2006). For a thorough critique of the deontological 
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40 Floyd (2010, 2011); Roe (2012). 
41 Floyd (2010). 
42 Floyd (2010), p 56. 
impossible to get inside elites’ heads to fully explain their positioning on an 
issue, understanding the migration–security nexus, let alone attempting to 
untangle it, requires a closer investigation of their threat perceptions, and, 
crucially, the consequences of securitisation for both the state and its 
supporting elites. 
The Securitisation of Migration in Greece 
Greece became a reception country of mass irregular migration flows in the 
early 1990s. These flows consisted of people from former socialist countries 
in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, for whom Greece was a final destination. 
Irregular migrants from neighbouring Albania formed the largest group 
during the 1990s – about 65 per cent according to the 2001 census. On the 
eve of the twenty-first century, Greece also became a transit country for 
undocumented migrants coming mainly from Asia and Africa. Their final 
destination is usually Western Europe; however, due to the Dublin II 
regulation and the intensification of internal EU border controls, they 
become trapped in Greece. Estimates of the number of migrants residing in 
Greece vary significantly, depending on the source, but is generally assumed 
that it exceeds one million in a country with a population of about eleven 
million citizens.43 
The state’s reaction to the influx of migrants was characterised by 
unpreparedness, inconsistencies and short-termism.44 The discourse of 
political elites emphasised the need to fortify the borders, protect national 
identity and curtail the development of socio-economic threats that migrants 
were deemed responsible for, often despite compelling evidence to the 
contrary.45 In the absence of a prior migration policy, the legal framework 
put in place in 1991 to deal with what was referred to as the ‘Aliens’46 was 
driven entirely by security considerations, and was designed to discourage 
flows. For instance, Law 1975/1991 excluded irregular migrants from 
welfare services, including health care (except in emergency cases) and 
education, and criminalised any form of solidarity from the private sector, 
such as access to housing and employment.47 It also adopted very narrow 
definitions of asylum and family reunification, which were in conflict with 
EU Directives on these matters.48  
A new Law 3386/2005 came into effect on 1 January 2006 (amended in 
January 2007 with Law 3613/2007), bringing Greece closer to the EU 
legislation and introducing some degree of liberalisation and rationalisation, 
particularly in relation to reunification conditions, residence and work 
43 Karyotis (2012). 
44 Triandafyllidou (2009); Triandafyllidou et al (2013); Karyotis (2012). 
45 See Karyotis (2012). 
46 Law 1975/1991 
47 Karyotis (2012). 
48 Mavrodi (2010). 
permits procedures, human trafficking and education.49 Nevertheless, many 
of these provisions did not apply to irregular migrants, who formed the 
majority, thus rendering them almost meaningless.50 Similarly, the 
introduction of a ‘Complete Action Plan’ for the Social Integration of 
Immigrants (articles 65–66 of Law 3386/2005), although a step in the right 
direction, remained largely on paper and was not really implemented in 
practice.51 
In the absence of a migration policy with a long-term view, the state 
opted for a series of regularisation programs, granting amnesty to categories 
of long-term migrants. Four such programs were adopted in 1998, 2001, 
2005 and a smaller one in 2007. As with other aspects of the legal 
framework on migration, these successive one-off programs were not only 
hampered by bureaucratic insufficiency and complexity,52 but, more 
importantly, could not possibly serve as a substitute for a coherent vision on 
how migration is to be dealt with. Accurately capturing these developments, 
Triandafyllidou concluded that Greece appeared to be ‘stuck for a long time 
with its national interests’ concerns and an over-arching view that migration 
is ‘an unwanted burden for the country’, indicative of the continuing 
dominance of the security frame that Greece, like other host states, finds 
hard to shake off. 53 
The detrimental impact of securitisation for migrants in Greece is not in 
question. UNHCR54 described the situation for asylum seekers and migrants 
in Greece as a ‘humanitarian crisis’. A recent report by the Human Rights 
Watch55 is particularly critical of specific practices implemented under the 
‘Xenios Zeus’ operation, which in August 2012 became the main internal 
migration control plan and is enforced mainly by the Hellenic Police. The 
report suggests that the ‘lengthy and intrusive procedure’ of ‘stop and 
search’ identity checks ‘amounts to arbitrary and discriminatory deprivation 
of liberty’,56 and are unlawful, as they discriminate against people based on 
their physical characteristics and ethnic/racial profile.57 Body pat-downs, bag 
searches, disrespectful treatment, rude, insulting and threatening behaviour, 
even physical violence are described as routine.58 Similarly, external border-
control practices, interceptions and systematic push-backs by the Hellenic 
Police and Coast Guard have been widely criticised for violating the 
49 Triandafyllidou et al (2009). 
50 Gropas and Triandafyllidou (2005); Antonopoulos et al (2008). 
51 Triandafyllidou et al (2013), p 23. 
52 Fakiolas (2003). 
53 Triandafyllidou et al (2009), p 174. 
54 UNHCR (2010). 
55 Human Rights Watch (2013). 
56 Human Rights Watch (2013), p 2. 
57 Human Rights Watch (2013), pp 3, 5. 
58 Human Rights Watch (2013), p 4. 
principle of non-refoulement.59 Partly in response to these criticisms, and to 
comply with EU legislation, such operations largely stopped in 2009, 
although they may still be informally used along the Greek–Turkish border.60 
The detention facilities of migrants, particularly in Evros, near Greece’s 
northern land borders, are described as ‘grim’ and compared with ‘medieval 
dungeons’.61 Overcrowding, poor hygiene, sporadic violence and a lack of 
access to legal aid, information and translators make the facilities 
‘synonymous with brutality, despair and dehumanisation’.62 There is also a 
notable absence of any provisions for vulnerable populations, such as 
unaccompanied minors, mentally or physically ill people and victims of 
torture – instead, all types of migrants and asylum seekers are blurred 
together into a single policing regime. For these reasons, the European Court 
of Human Rights has repeatedly ruled against Greece in a number of cases.63 
Securitisation Logics and Unintended Consequences 
The analysis has so far suggested that migration has been securitised in 
Greece since the early 1990s, with a predictably detrimental impact on 
migrant human rights.64 The remainder of the article focuses on evaluating 
securitisation from a consequentialist ethics perspective. The analysis draws 
heavily on discourse analysis of political elites’ public statements and 
relevant studies/reports written by security professionals during their training 
at the School of National Security and the Hellenic National Defence 
College. This is enriched by a set of 20 semi-structured, face-to-face 
interviews with security professionals, conducted in Athens (January 2012), 
on the Aegean islands (March 2012) and on the northern Greek border 
(Orestiada and Alexandroupoli, April 2012). 
The section begins by highlighting the threats Greek elites associate 
with migration that they believe justify its securitisation. The second part 
explores the extent to which securitisation has successfully curtailed the 
development of the perceived threats (‘referent object benefiting 
securitisation’). The third part of the section looks at the implications of 
securitisation for the power positions of securitising agents (‘agent 
benefiting securitisation’).  
59 See UNHCR (2009). 
60 Amnesty International (2013). 
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Elite Threat Perceptions 
The conviction that migration poses serious threats to the Greek society and 
state appears to be the driving force behind its mainly restrictive policies. 
The analysis of political discourse and the studies security professionals 
produced, as well as of the elite interviews, reveal certain logics behind the 
securitisation of migration and asylum, which are not dissimilar to those 
found in other host states. Migration is perceived as a threat for reasons that 
cut through a range of societal, criminological and economic arguments. 
First, the over-arching underlying concern is that migration is, above 
all, a threat to societal security. Waever65 notes that societal security 
‘concerns the ability of a society to persist in its essential character’ and 
maintain its ‘traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and 
religious and national identity and custom’. As a traditionally homogenous 
society, insecurities about Greece’s perceived demographic erosion due to 
the influx of migrants feature heavily in the discourse of its elites. For 
instance, Manos66 states that the regularisation of hundreds of thousands of 
migrants, combined with their much higher fertility rates compared with 
citizens, will result in the Greeks becoming a minority in their own country. 
Similarly, Kokkinis voices his concern that in one decade the numbers of 
foreigners in Greece will increase to seven million, while Dimitriadis 
maintains that there are regions in Greece where migrants already constitute 
25 per cent of the population.67 Echoing these views of security 
professionals, Giorgos Kaminis, the mayor of Athens, argues that migration 
constitutes ‘the number one problem’ for the city and beyond, and is directly 
responsible for Greece’s ‘gradual demographic decline’.68 
The problem is not just one of numbers, according to Greek elites, but 
also about how these migration trends, exaggerated or not, affect the societal 
security of the country. Migration is seen as a threat to national identity,69 
which can negatively affect the ethnic composition of the Greek population, 
its cultural references, its religious homogeneity and its linguistic 
coherence.70 Other security professionals adopt more dramatic tones in their 
discourse, with Manos arguing that ‘the erosion of the ethnological base of 
our country will bear painful consequences for Hellenism’ and Kokkinis 
worrying that, ‘In the not so distant future Hellenism will cease to exist.’71 
Muslim migrants in particular are seen as unwilling to integrate into society 
because ‘the laws, customs and culture in general of Muslims differ 
substantially from the Greek, Christian Orthodox ones’.72 This specific 
65 Waever (1993), p 23. 
66 Manos (2011), p 32. 
67 Kokkinis (2009), pp 132–3; Dimitriadis (2005), p 17. 
68 Enet (2011). 
69 Koukouras (2003), p 45. 
70 Drymousis (2012), p 41. 
71 Manos (2011), p 48; Kokkinis (2009), p 159. 
72 Drymousis (2012), p 28. 
targeting, other than its religious connotations, may have to do with the fact 
that it relates to more recent immigrants from Africa and Asia. Interestingly, 
hostility towards the Albanians who were seen as the undesirables in the 
1990s but have since received regularised status has largely evaporated, as 
blame and attention have shifted to the ‘new Others’. By contrast, as one of 
the interviewed police officers suggested, ‘We have nothing in common with 
the new migrants. We have an utterly different culture.’73 
Second, a discourse related to the identitarian axis sees migration as a 
threat to public order and health. The ‘criminal migrant’ thesis is based on 
the demonisation of the Other and the creation of an artificial continuum 
between migration, crime, disease and prostitution. Security professionals 
correlate the increase in criminality with the emergence of mass uncontrolled 
migration to Greece in the early 1990s.74 Moreover, ‘many of the crimes 
committed by foreigners are characterised by unprecedented impudence, 
toughness, cynicism, roughness and savagery for Greek standards’.75 The 
security professionals suggest two explanations for the increase in 
criminality. The first is that it is directly attributed to the entry of criminals 
in the country, either to escape from their home countries’ authorities76 or 
because they are part of their home countries’ ‘population dumping’ 
strategy77 that is a government’s attempt to get rid of criminal and unwanted 
persons. Second, it is attributed to the grave economic conditions in which 
migrants live in Greece: ‘All these migrants right now in Greece constitute a 
threat to the public order, since they are unemployed. Illegal migration goes 
hand-in-hand with criminality, especially in the context of the economic 
crisis.’78 Undocumented migrants are seen as particularly threatening 
because, as one interviewee explained, ‘We don’t know who these people 
are. We don’t know if they are dangerous. We don’t know their past.’79 
An additional shared concern of elites is that migration is a ‘public 
health bomb’.80 According to a security professional, ‘migrants bring in the 
country new/unknown diseases or diseases that have disappeared from 
Greece a long time ago’.81 This concern, too, relates to the grave living 
conditions of irregular migrants, which ‘foster the emergence and 
transmission of contagious diseases’.82 The association of migrants with 
unmonitored prostitution networks exacerbates the perception that they 
73 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Athens, 19 January 2012. 
74 See Koukouras (2003), p 87; Dimitriadis (2005), p 5; Tsironis et al (2009), p 8; Drymousis 
(2012), p 40. 
75 Kokkinis (2009), p 142. 
76 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Athens, 28 January 2012. 
77 Koukouras (2003), p 46. 
78 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Athens, 18 January 2012. 
79 Hellenic coast guard officer, interview recorded in Mitilene, 8 March 2012. 
80 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Orestiada, 6 April 2012. 
81 Manos (2011), p 35. 
82 Kokkinis (2009), p 151. 
foster the spread of sexually transmitted diseases – particularly since, as one 
interviewee put it, ‘there is absolutely no chance that women of African 
origin do not carry a disease’.83 The same message was evident in political 
discourse, with the Minister of Health Andreas Loverdos attempting to 
legitimise the government’s harder stance towards migrants prior to the 2012 
parliamentary elections on public health grounds. In his view, migrants are 
responsible for the ‘increase in contagious diseases, such as tuberculosis and 
AIDS, through sexual intercourse, drug use, and their squalid living 
conditions’.84 
Third, economic considerations add to the prevailing insecurity towards 
immigrants and asylum seekers, who are seen as ‘free riders’, ‘scroungers’ 
or ‘bogus’, plotting to exploit the socio-economic fabric of host societies. 
The economic burden they pose includes increasing unemployment, 
‘straining housing, education, and transportation facilities’85 and over-
burdening ‘already dilapidated welfare systems’.86 In the case of Greece, 
elites blame irregular migrants for their participation in the black market, for 
‘using the country’s social welfare services in a disproportionate way’ and 
for putting a strain on the economy by contributing to the increase in 
unemployment and the cost of welfare and national security.87 As before, 
recent migrants are particularly singled out for blame because, unlike those 
already settled in Greece (such as the Albanians), they send whatever money 
they get back to their home country, which drains the local economy, 
according to one interviewee.88 The resentment generated leads to what 
Huysmans89 describes as welfare chauvinism, whereby ‘immigrants and 
asylum-seekers are not simply rivals but illegitimate recipients of socio-
economic rights’. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the objective significance 
of the perceived threats migration poses, as identified in the discourse of 
relevant elites. A paucity of reliable data regarding the actual impact of 
migration on the economy, society and public health/order makes it hard to 
assess how seriously threatening these really are. Nevertheless, previous 
studies in Greece and other countries offer some clues that the real 
significance of the threats is exaggerated. For instance, studies assessing the 
economic impact of migration in Greece during the 1990s found that it 
mostly had a positive effect, as migrants did jobs that Greeks did not want to 
do and provided a dynamic flexible labour force that supported – when 
regularised – rather than abusing the welfare system, especially in the 
83 Border guard officer, interview recorded in Athens, 24 January 2012. 
84 Newpost (2012). 
85 Weiner (1992), p 114. 
86 Held et al (1999), p 313. 
87 Drymousis (2012), pp 36–7; Manos (2011), p 35. 
88 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Athens, 28 January 2012; Barlas et al 
(2004), p 68. 
89 Huysmans (2000), p 767. 
context of Greece’s ageing and declining population.90 Similarly, the 
participation of migrants in serious criminality was not significant enough to 
justify the widespread ‘Albanophobia’ that ensued during that decade.91 
Lohrmann summarises these debates eloquently, noting that ‘the fact that 
receiving countries are confronted with immigrants with different cultural 
backgrounds does not represent a threat in itself. Rather, it is the political 
exploitation of these cultural differences that confers a security dimension to 
immigration.’92  
Referent Object Benefiting Securitisation 
Policy-making is fundamentally about ‘applied problem-solving’, where 
constrained actors identify problems, articulate policy goals and (however 
imperfectly) use available policy tools in order to attain them.93 While 
assessments of policy, as well as securitisation, success remain notoriously 
slippery,94 Rita Floyd’s consequentialist ethics framework provides some 
direction. Its first assessment of the consequences of securitisation concerns 
the extent to which it curtails the development of the perceived threats 
identified above. Does securitisation result in better management of 
migration while reducing associated insecurities and vulnerabilities? The 
analysis in this section finds little evidence in favour of this notion. 
First, securitisation in response to perceived threats to the identity of the 
host state has the opposite effect to that desired. Typically, migration in 
Europe has been short term, with the majority of economic migrants 
eventually opting to return to their country of origin. For instance, despite 
increased migration movements from Central and Eastern Europe during the 
1990s, permanent migration declined substantially in the same period.95 
Paradoxically, it is the very restrictive policies advocated by the security 
frame that are more likely to lead migrants into settlement. This is because 
restrictionism and inflexible barriers to entry not only encourage irregular 
movements but also discourage migrants from investing and maintaining 
strong ties with their own countries in order to secure their access to work in 
Europe. This was the case in Germany after the oil crises in the 1970s, when 
the restrictive policies introduced encouraged family reunification and 
ultimately increased Turkish settlement.96 As Harris explains, ‘preventing 
people working so that they would not become citizens forced them to 
become citizens in order to work’.97 
90 Lianos et al (1996); Sarris and Zografakis (1999), p 158. 
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94 For policy success, see McConnell (2010). For securitisation success, see Karyotis and 
Judge (2013). 
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Second, the securitisation of migration also leads to an increased rather 
than a reduced possibility of physical threats to public order. The 
scapegoating of migrants and reproduction of the criminal-migrant 
discourse, amplified by misinformation given by the media and politicians, 
poses a major obstacle to their inclusion in host societies. In turn, as 
sociologist Robert Agnew explains, an increased intensity and frequency of 
strain experiences for migrants – for example, through discrimination and 
presentation of negatively valued stimuli – is likely to trigger migrant anger, 
aggression and criminal behaviour, not reduce them.98 Tensions between 
migrants and citizens in Greece have indeed intensified in recent years, 
resulting in social segregation, xenophobia, vigilantism against migrants99 
and racial violence between the two communities.100 For instance, the 
Network for the Recording of Incidents of Racist Violence identified a 
20 per cent increase in incidents of racist violence in 2012, compared with 
2011.101 In addition, migrant communities became increasingly mobilised, 
including through participation in protest activities, such as marches and 
hunger strikes, through which they demanded changes to the state’s 
immigration policy. Overall, with 80 per cent of Greeks feeling threatened 
by the presence of migrants in 2012,102 it is evident that securitisation did not 
reduce public insecurities but instead resulted in both citizens and migrants 
living in perpetual fear of each other.  
Third, and most importantly, securitisation in Greece failed 
spectacularly to reduce migrant flows or curtail irregular migration. Table 1 
presents recent migration statistics, which appear relatively unaffected by 
policy changes. 
Table 1: Overview of migration controls and asylum rates 
Year Apprehended 
migrants for illegal 
entry or residence 
Deported 
migrants 
Asylum 
applications 
(first and second 
instance) 
Asylum 
Positive 
Decisions 
2005 66,351 21,238 9,050 124 
2006 95,239 17,650 12,267 193 
2007 112,364 17,077 25,113 215 
2008 146,337 20,555 19,884 413 
2009 126,145 20,342 15,928 166 
2010 132,524 17,340 10,273 165 
2011 99,368 11,357 9,311 587 
2012 76,878 22,117 9,577 627 
Source: Hellenic Police 
98 Agnew (1992). 
99 Human Rights Watch (2012). 
100 Kokkinis (2009), p 23; Drymousis (2012), p 38. 
101 Skai (2013).  
102 Nooz (2012). 
The table also shows the extremely low acceptance rate of asylum 
applications, indicative of the securitised logic on migration. Clearly, 
population movements represent an important, multi-dimensional challenge 
for host societies. Irregular migration, in particular, is seen as a direct 
challenge to the legitimacy of the state, as it undermines the myth of control 
of its borders and many of its vital institutions, such as the army, police and 
the government.103 Nevertheless, all the security professionals interviewed 
shared the view that ‘the control and deterrence of illegal migration is 
futile’.104 Greece’s geostrategic location and the evolution of the modus 
operandi of smugglers render internal and external controls rather 
ineffective. This point requires further elaboration. 
Greece is located at the crossroads between Europe, Africa and Asia, 
and has primarily external borders with non-EU states. Its 13,676 kilometre-
long coastline is the eleventh longest in the world, comprising thousands of 
islands. The intensification of patrols across its sea borders does not deter 
smugglers from using them as one of the main routes for trafficking irregular 
migrants. Instead, if spotted by the authorities, they either try to land their 
smuggling boats to a different location or they intentionally sink them and 
flee, which often results in the death of unsuspecting migrants.105 
A prerequisite for any control measures to work, according to security 
professionals, would be to successfully implement coordinated patrols with 
neighbouring countries on both sides of the border. Although a number of 
such bilateral agreements have been signed, elites attribute the failure of 
pushing the border further away from Greek territory to the unwillingness of 
other countries, particularly Turkey, to implement them.106 
The second main entry point of irregular migrants into Greece is 
through its northern border with Turkey, in Evros. This border consists of 
12.5 kilometres of land (with no border demarcation but a 2-kilometre buffer 
zone) and another 186 kilometres separated by a river, which has an average 
width of 25 metres and is thus easy to cross, especially in the summer 
months. After Greece completed the clearance of anti-personnel mines in 
57 areas across the border in 2009, to comply with its legal obligations as a 
signatory to the ‘Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, 
Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their Destruction’, 
Evros became the smugglers’ preferred entry point into Greece.107 In 
response, Greece proceeded to further militarise the region with the 
construction of a 10.5-kilometre fence and the deployment of more than 
1800 police officers under Operation ‘Aspida’ (Shield). This had immediate 
results, as indicated by the fact that fewer than ten irregular migrants were 
detected crossing the border during the last week of October 2012, compared 
103 Anderson (1991). 
104 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Athens, 19 January 2012. 
105 Tsironis et al (2009); Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Orestiada, 6 April 
2012. 
106 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Alexandroupoli, 18 April 2012. 
107 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Orestiada, 6 April 2012; Schaub (2013). 
with about 2000 in the first week of August 2012.108 Nevertheless, it pushed 
smugglers back to the sea route, with more than 100 irregular migrants 
losing their lives in the Aegean Sea in the following four months.109 The 
sense among security professionals is that because smugglers continuously 
adapt to changing control mechanisms, deterrence does not work but simply 
transfers the problem to other parts of the country. 
Finally, security professionals are also sceptical about the effectiveness 
of internal migration controls, such as those implemented under Operation 
Xenios Zeus. They consider sweep operations a ‘smokescreen’, motivated 
only by the government’s electoral aspirations.110 Describing the process, 
one interviewee noted that the only thing police officers did was arrest and 
record migrants, detaining them for a few days and releasing them in a 
different area, thus transferring the problem elsewhere.111 To make matters 
worse, some security professionals also question whether internal and 
external controls act as a deterrent for irregular movement.112 This is because 
many migrants ‘want to be arrested. They are not hiding. This is their aim, 
because they have been informed that being arrested is part of their 
journey’113 and ‘because the conditions in detention centres are still better 
compared to the outside world’.114 
Agent Benefiting Securitisation 
The discussion so far suggests that securitisation is an excessive and 
ineffective response to the need for migration management that does little to 
alleviate perceived threats to the state and society. The second criterion for 
evaluating its implications, from a consequentialist ethics approach, is to 
assess the extent to which it serves the interests of the main securitising 
agents – that is, political and security elites. 
Starting with political elites, a key motivation for supporting the 
securitisation of migration, other than any national objectives deriving from 
their professional responsibility, is their assumption that in doing so, they are 
protecting their political legitimacy and enhancing their electoral prospects. 
Determining who belongs in a community – commonly in an adversarial 
way – and controlling access to its territory are defining functions of the 
state that, in the final instance, are always determined by its elites. Since 
migration calls into question these symbolic boundaries of belonging, 
political elites may use securitising rhetoric in order to maintain a certain 
myth of control, and thus safeguard their legitimacy.115 A particular concern 
108 Frontex (2013), p 20. 
109 Amnesty International (2013), p 7. 
110 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Athens, 19 January 2012. 
111 Border guard officer, interview recorded in Athens, 24 January 2012. 
112 Manos (2011), p. 37. 
113 Hellenic coast guard officer, interview recorded in Athens, 19 January 2012. 
114 Border guard officer, interview recorded in Athens, 24 January 2012. 
115 Bigo (1998). 
for them would be that a soft stance on migration may prove costly in 
electoral terms, or ‘lead to xenophobic popular sentiments and to the rise of 
anti-migrant political parties that could threaten the regime’.116 Operating 
within the parameters of their bounded rationality, elites may thus sustain the 
security frame on migration to cement their power positions and prevent 
public reactions. 
Nevertheless, the evidence from Greece challenges the suggestion that 
securitisation is beneficial to agents. As discussed, ‘the ability to control 
migration has shrunk as the desire to do so has increased. The reality is that 
borders are beyond control and little can be done to really cut down on 
immigration.’117 All securitisation then does is to create unattainable public 
expectations for effective ‘defence’ against the perceived threats from 
migration. An inability to deliver on these promises leaves both governing 
elites and security professionals susceptible to scrutiny and public criticism, 
which is exploited by anti-migrant parties and other political opponents.118 
This in turn, makes political elites sustain the security frame, even verging in 
some cases on outright xenophobia, since they feel that ‘their policy 
proposals must compete for this political territory’.119 
Securitisation may indeed serve the interests of political elites in the 
short term, by conveniently shifting blame and responsibility for some of 
society’s ills and their own failings.120 This seems to be the case in relation to 
the severe debt crisis that Greece has been experiencing since 2010. Prior to 
that, the government had made some moves towards a rationalisation of its 
immigration policy, with the introduction of more liberal laws (at least on 
paper), the incorporation of EU directives, the removal of landmines in 
Evros and a gradual softening of political rhetoric.121 The economic crisis 
abruptly interrupted this hesitant liberal turn, reinvigorating the security 
logic, as evidenced in both discourse and practices. 
Perhaps unexpectedly, immigration featured as one of the hottest issues 
in the campaign for the 2012 parliamentary elections. Parties of the interim 
governing coalition, PASOK and New Democracy, who had taken turns to 
govern Greece since 1974, adopted a strong stance on immigration in an 
attempt to shift focus and minimise electoral retribution for their austerity 
policies. For instance, Nikos Dendias, the Minister of Public Order and 
Citizen Protection, argued that: ‘Our social fabric is in danger of unravelling. 
The immigration problem is perhaps even bigger than the financial one.’122 
A similar intensification of securitisation with an increase in sweep 
116 Weiner (1992), p 114. 
117 Bhagwati (2003), p 99. 
118 Boswell (2008). 
119 Statham (2003), p 167. 
120 Guiraudon (2000). 
121 See Karyotis (2012). 
122 Ekathimerini (2012). 
operations had taken place throughout the 1990s in pre-election periods.123 
Still, PASOK’s Michalis Chrisochoidis rejected the claims that the salience 
of migration in 2012 was driven by electoral calculations, wondering: ‘Do 
diseases stop being transmitted and does criminality cease to exist prior to 
the elections?’124 
Whatever the intentions of PASOK and New Democracy might have 
been in terms of their harsher stance on migration, it did not prevent them 
from suffering major losses in the 2012 elections, with PASOK in particular 
losing more than two-thirds of its 2009 electoral share. Instead, it was the 
newly founded far-right Independent Greeks party and the extreme-right 
Golden Dawn that benefited most from this polarisation, with the latter 
entering parliament for the first time with an incredible 7 per cent share, up 
from just 0.29 in 2009. The two-decade failures of the governing parties of 
the centre to develop a coherent, balanced immigration policy, their 
miscalculation that shifting the focus on this issue would be beneficial to 
them and the lack of an evidenced-based assessment of the impact of 
migration on Greece appear to have backfired for the political elites who 
supported the securitisation of migration in the first place.  
The securitisation of migration does not seem to be bringing the expected 
benefits to security professionals either. Those interviewed mainly blame 
successive governments for their incoherent policies and their lack of support. 
Their perception is that there is inadequate political will to actually crack down 
on irregular migrants, who are instead being rewarded with legal status through 
the repeated regularisation schemes.125 Rather than feeling empowered by their 
central role in dealing with migration, the security professionals’ predominant 
emotions are frustration and disillusionment. For most, the dire conditions in 
detention centres and any bad treatment migrants receive are not driven by 
hostility towards them. Instead, it is a reflection of the fact that their own training 
is insufficient and outdated, their understanding of the evolving legal framework 
incomplete and their coordination with the state and other authorities fragmented 
and inefficient.126  
Finally, the theoretical assumption that securitising migration would 
increase the security professionals’ access to resources has to be rejected in 
this case. For instance, in 2011 financial difficulties forced the First Instance 
Asylum Committees of the Attica Aliens Police Directorate to postpone their 
operation for a significant period of time due to lack of printer toner and 
paper.127 Similarly, police vehicles in Patra and Thessaloniki were 
immobilised for several days as the police were not able to refuel them due 
123 Karyotis (2012). 
124 Ethnos (2012). 
125 Border guard officer, interview recorded in Athens, 24 January 2012; Tsironis et al 
(2009), p E8. 
126 Border guard officer, interview recorded in Athens, 24 January 2012; Hellenic police 
officer, interview recorded in Athens, 19 January 2012. 
127 Dama (2011). 
to financial constraints.128 Summarising the sentiment among security 
professionals, one of the interviewees noted that police officers ‘work for 
700–800 euros per month. They are given no incentives to do their job and 
are understaffed. Inevitably, any enthusiasm they might have had when they 
entered the profession evaporates fast – especially since they often work 
beyond nine to five, are not paid overtime and have to work under difficult 
conditions.129 
Conclusion 
Drawing on Floyd’s consequentialist ethics approach, our analysis of the 
Greek case suggests that the securitisation of migration appears to be an 
unjustified and inefficient response to the need for migration management. 
In lieu of the apparent inefficiency of the policies enacted to curtail the 
development of the perceived threats, as identified in elite discourse that 
migration is supposed to be posing to society and the state, securitisation 
appears to be a counter-productive strategy. In fact, the analysis suggests 
that securitisation is posing obstacles to the development of a coherent 
immigration policy with a long-term view, and prevents Greece from 
making headway towards managing its two-decade immigration crisis that 
only intensified during the recent economic downturn. 
Securitisation also produces more losers than winners. Migrants are 
inevitably those who have suffered the most from the restrictive policies and 
practices. At the same time, and counter-intuitively, political and security 
elites who have supported the security frame have also failed to benefit from 
it in terms of either attracting resources or enhancing their electoral 
prospects and/or power. Instead, the construction of the security frame from 
the top-down fuelled public insecurities, exacerbated social tensions and 
increased demand for more concrete but unattainable control measures, all of 
which ultimately harmed the interests of securitising agents. This leaves only 
parties of the far right, and perhaps human traffickers, as the main winners 
of the security frame that has characterised Greece’s stance on immigration 
since the early 1990s. 
How, then, should host countries like Greece manage population flows 
that are almost inevitable in a globalised world? The answer to this question 
requires a thorough review of past practices and legal frameworks and a 
clearer understanding of the challenges migration poses to all affected 
actors: the state, its elites, the citizens and the migrants. This may not 
automatically and in all cases result in a call for liberalisation of policies – 
after all, from a consequentialist ethics perspective, neither securitisation nor 
politicisation is by definition negative or positive.130 However, it should be 
the first step towards rationalising migration management that escapes the 
ill-informed assumptions that securitisation is always inevitable or beneficial 
128 Newsbeast (2012); Star (2011). 
129 Hellenic police officer, interview recorded in Athens, 19 January 2012. 
130 Roe (2012); Floyd (2010). 
and prevents the moral panic that often ensues from any exaggerated claims 
about its detrimental impact on host societies.131 Placing such debates and 
future research in a comparative context, with a particular focus on the 
intentions and consequences of securitisation, may help to untangle the 
security-migration nexus and allow for more efficient responses to the 
multifaceted challenges that relate to population movements.  
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